This paper quanties the eects of the Swedish green car rebate (GCR), a program to reduce oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions in the automobile industry. We estimate the demand for automobiles in the Swedish market and simulate counterfactual policies to assess dierent dimensions of the program. Our most conservative estimates nd the GCR to have increased the market shares of green cars by 5.5 percentage points and its cost to be about $109/tonCO2 saved, thus 5 times the price of an emission permit. Since the main green cars in Sweden are FFVs (exible-fuel vehicles), which can seamlessly switch between (high-CO2 emissions) gasoline and (low-CO2 emissions) ethanol, fuel choice is another dimension policymakers need to consider once fuel arbitrage is accounted for, the cost of CO2 savings increases by over 16 percent if 50 percent of FFV owners drive on gasoline instead of ethanol.
Introduction
Economists have been interested in the interplay between regulation and market outcomes since at least Ricardo (1817) . One century later, following seminal contributions by Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971), a substantial body of literature studying regulation developed. In particular, regulation in the transportation sector has received increased attention in recent years due to a number of policies implemented in dierent countries, following the increasing concern about GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions, notably CO2. The Swedish automobile industry is responsible for substantial amounts of employment, investment, exports and R&D in the country.
3 As a result, one may argue that on top of environmental concerns a policy such as the GCR could have been tailored to benet domestic producers, be it because of the economic importance of the industry or due to the fact that regulators are likely to be captured by businesses in the process of regulatory design Tirole 1991, Boyer and Laont 1999 ). This view is corroborated by the literature on strategic trade policy (Dixit 1984, Brander and Lewis 1985) , according to which beneting domestic producers could even be welfare-enhancing. In what follows, this paper examines the eect of environmental policy on both environmental and economic variables, focusing on the cost-eectiveness of the program and on the extent to which domestic carmakers beneted from its design, if at all.
The Swedish Green Car Rebate The Swedish Green Car Rebate (GCR) is one among a number of policies designed to incentivize the purchase of fuel-ecient vehicles worldwide amid 1 Subsidies were awarded to hybrid and electric vehicles in the US and Canada; China and Brazil reduced sales tax; scrappage programs were launched in the US and a number of European countries in 2008 and 2009. Given its design, the policy we study is closer in spirit to the US hybrid subsidy. 3 Having originated in Sweden, Volvo and Saab were taken over by US carmakers, thus becoming brands within conglomerates Ford and GM, respectively. The change in corporate control did not change the fact that the bulk of activities such as design, engineering and manufacturing of the local brands was still performed in Sweden, so much so that both are still considered local brands by Swedish consumers. Out of a population of 9 million, some 120,000 are employed by the automobile industry, which is responsible for over 10 percent of Swedish exports (BIL Sweden 2010).
the ever growing concern with GHG and the quest for oil independence. The GCR, which consisted of a 10,000 SEK rebate paid to private individuals purchasing new environmentally friendly or green cars. 4 Two features distinguish the GCR from similar policies elsewhere. First, in contrast with related policies elsewhere which have typically not been applied widely enough to aect a large fraction of the new vehicle market (Sallee 2011a ), the GCR was broad in that green cars commanded a 25 percent market share among newly-registered cars already in 2008, as compared to the 2.15 percent commanded by HEVs in the US after a similar policy (Beresteanu and Li 2011 ).
On the supply side, the number of green car models available on the Swedish market increased from 73 to 120 already in 2008 for perspective, Beresteanu and Li (2011) document 15 hybrid models available on the US market in 2007.
5
Second, the GCR relies on alternative (renewable) fuels to achieve its aims. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the skew towards renewables was inspired by Brazil, whose CO2 emissions per unit of fuel consumption in road trac are 20 percent below the world average due to the use of ethanol (IEA 2011a), although getting the support of the Green Party is sometimes also mentioned as an explanation for this feature of the policy. 6 The GCR dened a green car according to which fuels it is able to operate on and on how much CO2 it emits: while cars able to run only on regular (fossil) fuels (such as gasoline and diesel) were considered green cars provided they emitted no more than 120 gCO2/km, those able to run on alternative fuels (ethanol, electricity, and gas which we call CNG hereafter) were given a more lenient treatment roughly equivalent to 220 gCO2/km. As a result, 54 among the 120 green cars marketed in 2008 were alternative ones and two-thirds of the new green cars registered in 2008 were able to operate using renewable fuels. Among these, the dominant ones are FFVs (exible fuel vehicles), which seamlessly operate using any combination of ethanol and gasoline.
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While the rst FFV dates back to the early 1900s the Ford Model T was able to operate on gasoline, kerosene and ethanol it was only in the 1980s that vehicles able to operate using renewable fuels took center stage, in the Brazilian market. However, since the technology was based on captive ethanol vehicles, consumers were eectively locked-in and suered due to fuel shortages, which eventually resulted in the demise of the captive ethanol technology in the country. 8 Empirical Strategy We quantify the impacts of the Swedish GCR by estimating a structural model for the Swedish car market and examining a number of counterfactuals to the actual policy.
To do so we use a unique registration-based dataset for the Swedish car market with car models disaggregated at the fuel segment level which we combine with product characteristics, fuel and mileage data. 4 The rebate corresponds to roughly 6 percent o of the price of a new VW Golf 1.6. With the SEK/$ exchange rate at 6.984 (7.650 ) at the inception (end) of the program, the rebate was in the range $1,300-1,500. In what follows we use a SEK/$ exchange rate of 7 unless mentioned otherwise. 5 In the Swedish market, product introduction in the FFV and low-emission segments typically occurs via the introduction of new variants (versions) of existing models.
6 While countries such as France and Germany established an emission ceiling in their programs, the US has put forth a scrappage scheme; Sweden combined an emission threshold with renewable fuel requirements. See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/road.htm for an overview of the European framework. Note also that in the US the emission requirement is replaced with a (roughly equivalent) fuel economy one. In our analysis, we focus on both environmental and market eects of alternative policies. On the environmental side we quantify CO2 emission savings as well as their cost.
On the market side, we focus on market shares of dierent fuel segments and brand market shares, both overall and disaggregated by fuel segment.
9 This provides another dimension along which to evaluate the skew towards renewables and how the program aected dierent car manufacturers. In particular, we examine to which extent if at all local manufacturers Saab and Volvo beneted from the policy.
We consider three counterfactuals. First, we assess the overall impact of the GCR by considering a scenario with no environmental policy. Next, we address a key feature of the GCR, namely the asymmetric treatment of vehicles running on regular as compared to those running on alternative fuels. That is, we assess what would have happened had one treated regular and alternative fuels in a similar way by letting only vehicles emitting no more than 120 gCO2/km be classied as green cars and thus qualify for the rebate. savings can also be compared to the prices of emission rights and to the social cost of carbon (SCC) at about ve times the cost of CO2 emission permits or the value of the SCC, the estimates do not lend support to the view that the program was cost-eective.
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Accounting for the fact that a substantial share of FFV owners switches to the cheapest between gasoline and ethanol results in non-trivial cost increases. For instance, if gasoline usage among FFV owners is 50 percent, CO2 savings decrease by 14 percent and their costs by 16 percent as compared to the benchmark, reaching 883 SEK or $126. That is, the FFV technology makes fuel choice an additional dimension regulators have to take into account when designing policy.
Removing the asymmetry of the GCR would result in lower CO2 savings but also a lower cost, in both absolute and relative terms. Importantly, a symmetric version of the GCR would have minor eects on the market shares of alternative vehicles, which suggests that favoring them was not even necessary, i.e. consumers would have purchased alternative vehicles especially FFVs due to the potentially lower operating costs they provide by allowing to switch fuels.
Finally, in a scenario where carmakers were to fully replace their captive gasoline models with FFVs, CO2 savings would increase substantially, but at a high total cost for the taxpayer: this alternative policy would result in a roughly vefold cost increase as compared to the GCR. However, the high share of FFVs compounded with fuel switching would easily make the program very expensive also in relative terms, e.g. if 50 percent of FFV owners arbitrage across fuels, the cost of the program would be 36 percent above those of the actual GCR.
On the market front, the rst counterfactual highlights that high-emission vehicles, especially those running on gasoline, suered an ever increasing competition from fuel segments beneting from the GCR; these include low-emission regular vehicles and (high-emission) FFVs, all of which were eligible for the rebate and jointly experienced a 5.5 percentage point increase in market shares due to the policy. As a result, the main brands losing out from the policy were Swedish carmakers Volvo and Saab as well as (high-end) German carmakers Audi, BMW and Mercedes.
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A symmetric version of the GCR would make Saab and high-end German brands better o as compared to the actual policy.
The reason why Volvo would be at the losing end under such counterfactual is its focus on the high emission fuel segments, but such losses would be mild, amounting to less than 0.5 percentage point. Importantly, the market share of FFVs would decrease by less than 0.4 percentage point (from 14.1 to 13.7 percent) as compared to the GCR, which suggests that consumers would have purchased FFVs regardless of the policy. This nding is similar in spirit to those in Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar (2010), who look at hybrid electric vehicles in the Canadian market, and Sallee (2011b) , who nds evidence that consumers rather than producers capture most of the incentives oered when purchasing the Toyota Prius in the US market.
Finally, full conversion to the FFV technology would result in higher market shares for Swedish and high-end German brands as compared to the actual GCR, at least partially restoring market shares lost under the GCR. This nding once again shows how the FFV segment carved market share at the expense of high-emission gasoline vehicles.
Contribution and Related Literature We contribute to the burgeoning literature on the impact of policies targeted at the transportation sector, notably the automobile market, to promote the adoption of fuel-ecient technologies. To our knowledge, this is the rst attempt to structurally investigate a green car policy with a broad impact on the automobile market and skewed towards renewables. The use of a structural model allows to assess dierent aspects of the policy by performing counterfactuals.
The papers most closely related to ours are Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar (2010) and Beresteanu and Li (2011) , which look at policies designed to promote the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) in Canada and the US, respectively, both of which are close in spirit to the GCR. 12 13 Typically, the literature documents that although these programs tend to increase the market 13 While we focus on the car market as a whole, other studies have examined particular market segments or share of the market segment they promote at the expense of other ones, the cost of the programs is substantial.
14 This nding is likely to hold due to the fact that these programs typically target a small share of the market. More generally, the paper relates to early work by Pakes and Berry (1993) and Berry, Kortum and Pakes (1996) quantifying the impact of policy and environmental changes on the US car market and to recent research by Adamou, Clerides and Zachariadis (2012), which simulate alternative feebate schemes in the German car market and their eects in variables such as car sales, rm prots and CO2 emissions.
The paper also relates to the literature focusing on the cost of (environmental) regulation. For instance, Gollop and Roberts (1983) The paper also assesses the extent to which dierent carmakers beneted from the policy. In doing so, it relates to the literature on regulatory capture, according to which businesses with the greatest stake in regulatory activity are likely to attempt to inuence regulators. Early contributions to this literature include Olson (1965) and Stigler (1971) . Laont and Tirole (1991) express the argument in terms of agency theory, Boyer and Laont (1999) specically focus on environmental regulation whereas Dixit (1984) and Brander and Spencer (1985) emphasize how trade policy can be used to benet domestic producers.
The focus on alternative fuels connects the paper to the literature studying the interaction between fuel and car markets and to the one focusing on renewable fuels. In the case of the former, the evidence is that consumer reactions are surprisingly slow (Borenstein 1993). This nding can be attributed to the fact that the dominant automobile engine is typically captive and/or there is no fueling infrastructure available for alternative fuels. As opposed to what happens in markets such as the US, where Corts (2010) documents a low market penetration of ethanol due to the lack of fueling infrastructure, Sweden has a well-developed network of fueling stations where ethanol is readily available. Thus, the majority of FFV owners tends to react to fuel prices, eectively arbitraging across fuels (gasoline and ethanol). Thus, it is then important to account for the fact that a fraction of motorists might switch between fuels in the calculation of CO2 savings and their associated costs, i.e. fuel choice is another dimension to be accounted for in policy design.
Institutional Background
Despite being smaller than markets such as the French and German ones, the Swedish car market is comparable to larger European ones when looking at ownership on a per capita basis and ownership per household, as reported in Table 1. 15 At 9.5 years of age, the average Swedish car is however older and its engine larger than its French or German counterparts. What is more, among the EU 18 countries (the original EU 15 countries plus Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia) Sweden models. Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) estimate the eect of state and local incentives, rising gasoline prices, and environmental ideology on hybrid vehicle sales; Kahn (2008) studies the eect of environmental preferences on the demand for green products; Sallee (2011b) studies the incidence of tax credits for the Toyota Prius.
14 The most conservative estimate among the above papers, by Li et al (2011) , is that the ton of CO2 saved cost $91, roughly ve times the price of the corresponding emission permit. At the other end of the spectrum, Metcalf (2008) estimates this cost to be $1700 for the US ethanol program. 15 The numbers presented in Table 1 include all registered passenger cars, thus also including those owned by businesses and government. 1617 Cars able to run on fuels other than gasoline and diesel (or alternative fuels) qualify as green cars if their consumption is lower than the equivalent of 9.2 liters/100 km using gasoline or 9.7 m3/100 km using gas (typically CNG, compressed natural gas); electric cars are considered green if their consumption is no greater than 37 kWh/100 km. The dierence in treatment dispensed to regular and alternative fuels becomes evident if these gures are converted to emission levels: the threshold for alternative vehicle to be considered a green car is equivalent to about 220 gCO2/km running on gasoline.
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The Swedish Passenger Car Market The overall number of brands and models on the Swedish market increased during the sample period, especially following the inception of the GCR.
In particular, the changes in the number of low emission models (those emitting less than 120 gCO2/km) marketed were non-trivial, increasing from 46 in 2007 to 69 in 2008 and 89 in 2009, see Table 2 . These numbers suggest carmakers did react swiftly due at least in part to the GCR.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
16 In contrast to the US market, emission thresholds in Sweden apply to individual cars rather than to a brandlevel sales-weighted average. At the equivalent of about 193 gCO2/mile, this emission threshold is already more stringent than the 250 gCO2/mile CAFE standard to take eect from 2016 in the US.
17 Emissions of 120 gCO2/km correspond to fuel consumption of about 5 liters of gasoline or 4.5 liters of diesel per 100 km (75.7 and 84.1 mpg, respectively). Diesel cars must also have particle emissions of less than 5 mg/km, meaning that they need to have a particle lter. Purchasing a Car The registration of a vehicle with The Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen) must take place within ten working days of a change in vehicle ownership. Sweden being a small market, car dealers keep a very low inventory level, so much so that typically one has to order a car a few months in advance and make a deposit. This results in very few episodes of sales or rebates from the part of carmakers and/or dealers. This evidence is reassuring in light of the use of list prices when estimating demand. 19 
Data
We combine a number of datasets, from administrative-based registration data to car characteris- 
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Combining Datasets One important issue arising when merging characteristics and registration datasets is that the former is observed at a more disaggregated level than the latter. Despite being more aggregated than car characteristics, the level of aggregation in registrations is still more rened than standard market level datasets in that we observe sales for dierent versions at the fuel level. For each combination of year-brand-model-fuel we use characteristics from the baseline version, i.e. the lowest priced model. Importantly, given the relatively small number of green versions (typically one or two per model), aggregation issues for these models essentially vanish.
Estimation

Demand
Model Specication We estimate the demand for cars using discrete choice models for market level data, following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, BLP). The starting point is a microeconomic model of rational behavior for individual consumers (or households) which is then aggregated to generate market demands. Consumers buy at most one of the products available on the market and, if so, the one yielding the highest utility among the available products. The econometrician does not observe individual choices, only market level data, i.e. prices, quantities and a set of characteristics for each of the J products available on the market for a number of periods (we suppress the index t below to avoid clutter). These inside products are indexed by j = 1, ..., J, and the outside good, the option to buy a used car or to not buy a car at all is represented by j = 0. Dene the conditional indirect utility of individual i when consuming product j as
20 That is, we do not observe micro level data on mileage. As a result, we are unable to estimate a joint model of vehicle choice and utilization as in, e.g., Goldberg (1998) . where x jk are observed product characteristics such as horsepower and engine size while ξ j are characteristics observed by the market participants but not the econometrician (such as quality, style etc). We decompose the individual coecients as β ik = β k +σ k v ki , where β k is common across individuals, v ki is an individual-specic random determinant of the taste for characteristic k, which we assume to be Normally distributed, (v 1i , ..., v Ki ) ∼ N (0, Σ), and σ k measures the impact of v on characteristic k. Finally, ε ij is an individual and option-specic idiosyncratic component of preferences, assumed to be a mean zero Type I Extreme Value random variable independent of both consumer attributes and product characteristics. Since consumers may decide not to buy a new car, the specication of the demand system is completed with an outside good yielding conditional indirect utility u i0 = ξ 0 + σ 0 v i + ε i0 , where ε i0 is a mean zero individual market and time specic idiosyncratic term and v i is an individual specic component reecting heterogeneity in tastes.
The above estimation strategy assumes away a number of important features in the car market. Identication Besides the exogenous characteristics, we use the set of BST instruments, following Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997). That is, we use a set of polynomial basis functions of exogenous variables within a market segment. For a given market segment, we calculate the number of other products of the same rm and the number of rms in the same group, and the number of other products of the same producer in the same group. BST instruments implicitly assume a form of localized competition among products, and this seems consistent with anecdotal evidence for the automobile industry, characterized by a number of market niches and highly dierentiated products.
Estimates We consider demand specications with the following characteristics: engine power (measured in horsepower, HP), engine size (measured in cubic centimeters, CC), fuel economy (liters/100km, under mixed driving), vehicle tax and price. We also include time (month), brand, market segment, fuel segment (gasoline with emissions above and below 120 gCO2/km, diesel with emissions above and below 120 gCO2/km, FFV, gasoline/electric and gasoline/CNG) xedeects and interactions of fuel economy and fuel segment xed-eects. 21 Consumer heterogeneity is introduced into price coecients via 500 antithetic pairs of random draws of the standard Normal distribution. (The Appendix reports a number of alternative specications also experimented with.)
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We rst compare alternative demand estimates in Table 3 . Specication 1 (OLS ) reports the estimates obtained when price is assumed to be exogenous, i.e. it is a standard OLS logit regression 21 We have also experimented with product xed-eects, with unsatisfactory results. This is likely to be due to the use of a relatively short sample period, frequent name changes in products and moderate product entry and exit.
with market level data. Columns 2 and 3 report IV logit and RC logit estimates, respectively, using the instruments suggested by BST (1997).
Specication 1 features a negative and signicant price coecient of -0.0026. Own-price elasticities are however typically less than one in absolute value, which is inconsistent with the assumption of prot-maximizing rms.
Accounting for price endogeneity as in Specication 2 results in a steeper demand curve, in that the estimated price coecient increases a vefold as compared to its OLS counterpart. An immediate result from controlling for price endogeneity is the improved estimates of own-price elasticities, now in the range 1.4-4.2.
Introducing heterogeneity in the form of a random coecient for price renders a price coecient of -0.0220, thus about eight times the magnitude of its uninstrumented counterpart. More importantly, it improves own-price elasticities: the 10th and 90th percentiles are given by 5.3 and 2.5, respectively, with a median value of 3.9. These values are in line with standard estimates for European markets using market level data. For instance, Goldberg and Verboven (2001) report elasticities in the range 3-6 in their Table 6 . The remaining estimates are in line with economic theory and the literature, e.g. consumers prefer higher engine power and engine size. 22 
Supply
We consider a standard dierentiated product Bertrand-Nash pricing game on the supply side of the market. There are J products (indexed by j = 1, ..., J) which are produced by F rms (indexed by f = 1, ..., F ), each of which produces a subset of products f ⊂ {1, ..., J}.
23 Firm f chooses the prices of its products to maximize its prots according to the prot maximization problem
where c j is the marginal cost of product j, assumed constant. Provided equilibrium prices of all products on the market are positive and all goods are sold in positive quantities (and so the constraints for this program do not bind in equilibrium, as is typically assumed in the empirical literature), the rst-order conditions are given by
Product ownership is represented by the ownership matrix which, to each product in the market, assigns the rm producing it. Dene the matrix ∆ of dimension J by J and typical element ∆ jk = 1{both j and k produced by the same rm, j, k = 1, ..., J} where 1{.} is the indicator function. Using the ownership indicators, the rm's rst order condition may be rewritten as:
The (implicit) solution to this set of equations,
provides the prices at which each rm is maximizing its prots given the prices of others, and hence is the Nash equilibrium price to the game. Notice that there is one of these rst-order conditions from rm f 's objective function for every k ∈ f . Thus, we obtain a total of J rst-order conditions, one for each product.
5 Policy Experiments
Overview
We assess the eect of three counterfactuals on both environmental and market dimensions, namely (i) CO2 emission savings and their associated costs; (ii) Market shares by fuel segment; (iii) Brand market shares disaggregated up to fuel segment. Following the literature, we allow carmakers to compete in prices à la Bertrand-Nash throughout the analysis. Moreover, our analysis is essentially short run in that we do not account for endogenous changes in product characteristics (see, e.g. Counterfactual II (Symmetric GCR) considers the eects of a common threshold of 120 gCO2/km applied to regular and alternative fuels. One immediate eect of such a symmetric policy is that since no single FFV emits less than 120 gCO2/km (see Table 2 ), no FFV qualies as a green car. scenario thus stresses a potentially perverse eect of the program whereby too many FFVs would qualify for the rebate and increase the total cost of the program, without necessarily using ethanol.
To calculate CO2 emission savings, we combine mileage estimates and fuel economy data with car sales in every scenario considered, see Section 3 for details. The resulting CO2 emissions are then divided by the total cost of the GCR to obtain the cost of CO2 savings.
While the baseline specication in each experiment considers a situation in which FFV owners do not drive using gasoline, we do also allow for the fact that FFVs enable their owners to arbitrage across fuels. Since a non-negligible share of FFV owners in Sweden takes advantage of fuel arbitrage and gasoline emits more CO2 than ethanol, fuel switching increases the cost of CO2 savings and fuel choice is an additional margin policymakers have to take into account in considering the design of policies.
25 Thus, besides the baseline case (i.e., no gasoline usage) we also report results for 25, 50 and 75 percent of gasoline usage to gauge the cost-eectiveness of the program.
Environmental Eects
CO2 Savings and their Costs Table 4 reports estimated CO2 savings and the associated costs of the experiments considered. 26 While the results in Table 4 key margin to be taken into consideration. In the absence of fuel switching, the emission savings amount to 3,159.8 thousand tonCO2, whereas a 50 percent of gasoline usage results in savings of a still sizable 1,474 thousand tonCO2. Although at 470.9 percent of the cost of the actual GCR the total cost of the program is substantial, at 558 SEK/tonCO2 its cost relative to emission savings is comparable to the GCR in the case of no fuel switching. However, the substantial presence of FFVs in the new car eet induces a non-trivial cost increase once fuel arbitrage is accounted for:
this cost increases to 1197 and 1704 SEK under 50 and 75 percent of gasoline usage, respectively.
The results in Table 4 27 Among the fuel segments beneting from the GCR, the leading one is the FFV, which commands 14.1 percent, followed by low emission gasoline and diesel, with 6.68 and 3.61 percent, respectively. Gasoline/electric and gasoline/CNG vehicles command less than 1 percent of the market and face negligible changes across counterfactuals. The results in Figure 2 suggest that the actual GCR has shifted demand from high emission vehicles to both FFVs and low emission vehicles. A symmetric version of the GCR would have further increased the presence of low emission vehicles and hardly aected the one of FFVs, suggesting that the skew towards renewables which was an essential part of the GCR would not have been necessary, i.e. consumers would have purchased FFVs regardless. However, had carmakers adopted the FFV technology en masse, the main gainers would have been low emission FFVs, which would make substantial ground at the expense of diesel vehicles, both low and high emission.
Brand Market Shares Figure 3a reports the eect of the GCR on brand-level market shares.
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The main players operating in the Swedish market are Volvo (15.9 percent market share), Toyota Figure 3c shows the eect of the symmetric GCR on the overall market shares of car manufacturers. The main brands beneting from such a policy would be Toyota, Citroen and Peugeot, all of which have a marked presence in low emission segments, whereas the main loser would be Volvo, which has a substantial presence in the FFV and the high-emission segments, precisely the ones losing out from a symmetric policy. (ii) High Emission Diesel Segment Volvo is the leading brand within the high emission diesel segment, commanding a 6.24 percent market share, and followed by Peugeot and VW, both of which command just over 2 percent, and far ahead of the remaining brands, see Figure 5a . (iii) Low Emission Gasoline Segment The main players in this segment are Toyota, Peugeot,
Hyundai and Citroen, with market shares in the range 0.9-2.82 percent of the market. Figure 6b shows that under the counterfactual of no policy, Asian manufacturers Toyota and Hyundai are the main losers in this segment, , with a decrease of roughly 0.8pp in market shares.
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As already reported in Figure 2c , the low emission gasoline segment witnessed an increase in market share under Counterfactual II. Figure 6c shows that the main gainer was Toyota (0.649pp), followed by Peugeot (0.312pp) and Citroen (0.231pp).
(iv) Low Emission Diesel Segment The main player in the low emission diesel segment under the GCR is Citroen, which commands a market share of 1.44, well ahead of VW and Opel, both of which command about 0.5 percent, see Figure 7a . Figure 7b shows that the leadership of Citroen results essentially from the GCR abolishing it results in a decrease of roughly 1pp for the French brand. Figure 7c shows that the symmetric GCR has a mild eect across brands whereas Figure 7d shows that full conversion to the FFV technology of the existing gasoline models would again have mostly hurt Citroen, which would have lost nearly 0.9pp. Figure 8b shows that these brands beneted by the GCR. Next, Figure 8c shows that a symmetric version of the GCR would have mild eects across brands only Volvo would lose more than 0.1pp. Figure 8c thus shows not only that consumers would have purchased FFVs even without the GCR as already pointed out in Figure 2c , but also that the brands operating within this segment would hardly be aected. 
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Conclusion
This paper estimates a structural model of the Swedish car market to examine environmental and market eects of the Swedish green car rebate (GCR). Our ndings can be summarized as follows.
First, the cost of the program was comparable to those of recent US counterparts. We estimate the cost of CO2 emission savings over the lifetime of vehicles purchased via the GCR to be in the range $109-132/ton CO2, thus ve to six times the price of an EU emission permit and at the lower end of estimates for the US, even if the policy aected the market more widely than elsewhere.
Second, Swedish and high-end German brands, all of which have a marked presence in the high emission gasoline segment, lose substantial market share as a result of the GCR. This result is at odds with the view that regulators are captured by (local) businesses.
Third, the nding that a symmetric version of the GCR has mild eects on the market share of FFVs suggests that the potentially lower operating costs provided by this technology would have been enough to attract consumers to this fuel segment, rendering the GCR unnecessary to shift demand towards vehicles able to operate on alternative fuels. Put in another way, the FFV technology would not need to be subsidized to attract consumers. The paper assesses a unique policy skewed toward renewables and which aected a substantial share of the new car market. The ndings highlight that policymakers ought to take into account the technologies in use in the markets they are regulating. This issue is to become ever more important as more and more alternative technologies, e.g. hybrid, multifuel, are brought to market in the coming years.
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Sales data Vroom has adjusted new car registration data to better represent the cars that are actually used by an individual and that do not serve as demonstration units or alike. For a registration to be included in the data set, the vehicle has to be acquired by an individual within 30 days of the registration. The sales data is aggregated at the base model level for each fuel type,
i.e. the item Audi A3 gasoline contains all versions of the A3 that are primarily driven on gasoline.
We consider seven dierent fuel segments: high-and low-emission gasoline; high-and low-emission diesel; gasoline/ethanol (FFVs); gasoline/gas (CNG); and electric hybrids.
Vehicle characteristics The characteristics data is on a more disaggregated level than the sales data, e.g. there are 18 dierent Audi A3 gasoline versions. To be able to combine characteristics and sales data, we have aggregated the characteristics over sub-models based on the baseline model, thus following the literature, e.g. BLP (1995) . Following the Swedish Consumer Agency denition, we dene market segments according to vehicle weight, with the ve segments dened by the thresholds 1100, 1250, 1400 and 1600 kg.
Combining sales data and characteristics When combining the sales data and the characteristics data, a small fraction of the observations did not have a match. We thus expanded our search as follows, checking the following manually. First, we checked for the same brand, model and fuel type for the following year, since models for a given year are released late in the prior fall.
Second, we checked for the same brand and fuel type for the same year. Third, for the same brand and fuel type for the following year. Finally, for the same fuel type and same year (the standard deviation is lower within a population consisting of cars of the same fuel type but dierent brands than within a population of a certain brand but with dierent fuel types). ). For winter months, the ethanol blend used is E75, which has a higher consumption (approximately 42% higher). For these months, the carbon dioxide emissions are multiplied by 1.42×688.3 100 .
Fuel economy and CO2 emissions
To estimate CO2 emissions, we estimate yearly mileage driven (in km), together with a measure of CO2 emissions (in g/km). For captive cars, mileage estimates are based on the results reported in Appendix C whereas for FFVs they also depend on the fraction of vehicle owners using each fuel.
We consider four cases, namely 0, 25, 50 and 75 percent gasoline usage. Although we do not take a stand on which level looks more appropriate, Huse (2012) documents a 73 percent reduction in monthly ethanol sales following the 2008 oil price drop, which suggest that fuel switchers correspond to a non-negligible share of FFV owners.
The emission data for gas (CNG) is based on what is called certication gas, which is the same as fossil gas (Din Bil Stockholm/Hammarby, 2008). Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil gas are evaluated to be 2120 g/m3 whereas for biogas these are evaluated to 390 g/m3. The supply of vehicle gas in Sweden consists of both fossil gas and biogas, as well as a mixture of the two.
According to Din Bil, the supply is evenly split, which is consistent with the report by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2008a) which states that, in 2007, 53 percent of the vehicle gas sold was biogas and 47 percent was fossil gas. The emission data for gas cars is hence not correct since it assumes all cars are driven on fossil gas, thus the general emission levels for gas cars are exaggerated. We therefore re-estimate these to be equal to gas consumption per km*(2120*0.47 + 390*0.53), based on the numbers above.
Potential market To go from observed quantities to observed market shares we need to dene the size of the potential market for each time period. One way to obtain the potential market variables would be by estimating them, as suggested in Reiss and Wolak (2005) . Alternatively, one could follow the criterion used in BLP (1995), where the total number of households constitutes the potential market. According to Reiss and Wolak (2005) , this denition has some shortcomings.
First, not all households can aord a new car and other entities than households can purchase cars.
Since we only examine car sales to individuals, only the former poses a possible problem. It is not realistic that all households can aord to purchase a new car, therefore this would overestimate the potential market. Therefore we dene the market as the number of individuals (instead of households, as Sweden has a high number of single person households) above the age of 20 with a yearly income of 200,000 SEK (about $27,500) or more. These are the potential purchasers of a new car. It is however unlikely that they can consider buying a new car each month. We therefore assume that consumers generally consider buying a new car every fth year, thereby dividing the numbers by 60.
B Counterfactuals (Not for publication)
Impact of the rebate on aggregate sales When calculating the counterfactuals, we need an estimate of the share of the outside good. In order for us to be able to use the market shares for the outside good from the actual scenario, i.e. with the rebate, we must ensure that there is no correlation between the rebate and total sales. We follow Chandra et al (2010) and examine the eect of the rebate on aggregate sales by estimating the following equation
where 1{GCR t } represents the rebate dummy, z t contains potential market characteristics such as the CPI and the Industrial production index by Statistics Sweden. The results are reported in Table B1 . There is no evidence of an eect of the rebate on aggregate sales. Thus we use the actual market shares for the outside good when computing the counterfactuals. Table B2 . The reason why the increase in savings is less than proportional than the one in lifetime is the decreasing yearly mileage of older vehicles (see Table C2 for the case up to 15 years). However, when it comes to Counterfactual III, notice that CO2 savings increase only if all FFV owners are assumed to drive on gasoline (0% gasoline usage) fuel arbitrage is such that CO2 savings may indeed decrease under an extended vehicle lifetime. On the cost side, the results mirror those Table C2 and are consistent with some stylized facts.
30 First, yearly mileage decreases with age. Second, diesel vehicles are the most heavily used vehicles whereas gasoline ones are the least heavily used. Gasoline/CNG vehicles are slightly less used than diesel ones, but more than FFVs and gasoline/electric vehicles. 31 The results are similar to those reported in Table 3 .
Second, we considered alternative specications of the conditional indirect utility function used to estimate demand. For instance, we considered the following alternatives for the price and/or engine size coecients:
1. β P =β P + σ y y i + σ AGE AGE i . Both y i and AGE i were draws from the income and age distributions of the Swedish population 2. β P =β P + σ y y i and β CC =β CC + σ AGE AGE i . In this alternative, we experimented with heterogeneity based in income for the price coecient and heterogeneity based on age for the engine size coecient.
3. β P =β No specication was able to deliver results better than those of the ones reported in Table 3 . More specically, they were not able to capture enough heterogeneity to ensure the markups to be not monotonically decreasing with product prices. Since our market shares are quite small, given the large number of models in each time period, low heterogeneity implied not only lower percentage markups for higher priced cars, but also lower absolute markups for such automobiles, clearly at odds with what one would expect in this market.
31 NFP settings included a convergence tolerance of 1e-13 for the contraction and 1e-6 for the optimization using the KNITRO optimizer. Figure 6c displays changes in market shares under the counterfactual of a symmetric GCR as compared to the GCR. For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. .066
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1.01 gasoline vehicles with FFVs as compared to the GCR (Note also the distinction between high-and low-emission FFVs when examining Counterfactual III). For the sake of clarity, the figure omits some brands for which changes in market shares were negligible. 
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